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NEWS
CAVEAT SURFER: Recent Developments

in the Law Surrounding Browse-Wrap
Agreements, and the Future of Consumer
Interaction with Websites
Drew Block*

I. Introduction
The incredible growth of the Internet over the course of the
past decade has fundamentally changed the way people interact with
the world. This change is evidenced through electronic
communications, information gathering, and every aspect of consumer
culture through the growth of e-commerce. Due to the rapidity of this
growth, however, the legal community has struggled to define the
terms of this new form of interaction.
In order to regulate the use of information and services found
on websites, many websites have created license and use agreements
that purport to have the effect of enforceable contracts.' Of the many
types of agreements found on the Internet, one of the most pervasive
types are those known as browse-wrap agreements. 2 These agreements
are most commonly found in small print hyperlinks at the bottom of
home pages. 3 The hyperlinks generally link to other pages that lay out

* J.D. candidate, May, 2003; Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.,
History, Classics, 2000, The Ohio State University.
1 Dawn Davidson, Comment, Click and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound
to When They Enter Web-Sites?, 26 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1171, 1173 (2000).
2The term "browse-wrap" appears in Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d
974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000); see also Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150
F. Supp. 2d 585, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
3 Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594. Hyperlinks may be found on many major

websites,

including

http://www.amazon.com,
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the terms and conditions between the user and the site. These terms
and conditions attempt to control use of the website and become
enforceable as soon as the user moves beyond the home page. 4
Browse-wrap agreements are of questionable enforceability, however,
because of their lack of one of the traditional elements of a contract,
5
namely mutual assent between the contracting parties.
The lack of mutual assent in browse-wrap agreements is
evident in the fact that the user is not required to actually view the
terms of the agreement before proceeding beyond the home page, at
which point the agreement is said to become valid.6 This characteristic
distinguishes browse-wrap agreements from shrink-wrap and clickwrap agreements, which have been enforced by several courts.7
Nevertheless, few courts have reached the issue of the enforceability
http://www.eBay.com, ("User Agreement"), http://www.msn.com, ("Terms of
Use"), and http://www.aol.com, ("Legal Notices").
4 See, e.g., http://www.expedia.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2002), a well known
travel site. Under the "Expedia.com terms of use" link found at the bottom of the
home page, the first paragraph of the notice states:
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND EXPEDIA, INC.
This Website is offered to you, the customer, conditioned on
your acceptance without modification of the terms, conditions,
and notices contained herein. Your use of this Website
constitutes your agreement to all such terms, conditions, and
notices.
Thus, one can clearly see that no active assent is necessary. Use of the site is
said to constitute assent, and the user is not required to view the license agreement.
5 The best discussion of this problem can be found at Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at
594-96. See also Susan Y. Chao, Casenote, Contract Law-Electronic Contract
Formation-DistrictCourtfor the Central District of CaliforniaHolds That a Website License Does Not Equate to an Enforceable Contract-Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., 54 SMU L. REv. 439, 443 (2001).
6 See supra note 4; see also Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
7 See, e.g., ProCd v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrinkwrap agreements held valid); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a contract shipped with a computer to be enforceable
even though it contained "the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to
users of its software"); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 533
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (while the Caspi court never used the term "clickwrap agreement," they held a contract valid where the "membership agreement
appears on the computer screen in a scrollable window next to blocks providing the
choices 'I Agree' and 'I Don't Agree"').
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of browse-wrap agreements, and consequently, this aspect of contract
law is ill defined.

II. Background
There are three primary forms of agreements employed by
software and website providers. These types of agreements are known
as "shrink-wrap," "click-wrap," and "browse-wrap" agreements, and
while all three primarily deal with issues of licensing, they differ
dramatically in form. It is necessary to briefly explain click-wrap and
shrink-wrap agreements because the little case law dealing with
browse-wrap agreements has stemmed from judicial determinations
concerning these agreements.
A. Shrink-Wrap Agreements
The term "shrink-wrap" agreement describes contracts
contained within the packaging of software, with notice of such
contract on the outside of the packaging. 8 The purchaser of software
containing a shrink-wrap agreement is bound by the terms of the
agreement even though the purchaser cannot read the terms of the
agreement before purchasing the product. 9 Generally, these
agreements are found enforceable as soon as the purchaser uses the
product because use proves the purchaser had an opportunity to read
the terms of the agreement in the package. 10
B. Click-Wrap Agreements
One type of agreement commonly found on the Internet is the
"click-wrap" agreement. Click-wrap agreements appear on computer
screens when a user enters a website. The agreement requires the user
to either agree or disagree with the presented terms by clicking on a
box stating "I Agree" or "I Disagree."1 These agreements most
8 Specht,

150 F. Supp. 2d at 592.

9 ProCd,86 F.3d at 1449.

1o Id. at 1452. It is also notable, that with regard to ProCD, a click-wrap license
was also included as part of the software, and therefore the user would have to
actively assent to the terms of the agreement.
"1Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
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commonly appear when a user downloads or installs software, or
requests some service from a website. The notable aspect of this type
of agreement is that the user is required to take an affirmative step in
agreeing with the terms presented, and therefore, presumably has an
opportunity to read and consent to the terms and conditions imposed
by the agreement.
C. Browse-Wrap Agreements
The most common type of agreement found on the Internet is
the browse-wrap agreement, and this type of agreement takes many
different forms. Generally, they are found in small print hyperlinks at
the bottom of home pages, and these hyperlinks generally link to
12
another page that lays out the terms of use for the particular website.
This type of agreement has come to be known as a browse-wrap
agreement, rather than a click-wrap agreement, because the user need
not click an "I Agree" button in order to continue viewing the1 3site, and
must if fact browse the page in order to locate the agreement.
Browse-wrap agreements purport to control use of the website
and become enforceable as soon as the user moves beyond the home
page. 14 The notable characteristic of this type of agreement is that the
user is not forced to read the terms before proceeding beyond the
home page, and may not even be aware of the existence of the
agreement. Confusion about these agreements is compounded by a
startling lack of uniformity with regard to the notice of their existence.
The title of the links giving access to these agreements vary from site
'1 6
'1 5
to site, and may be titled "user agreement," "conditions of use,"
"terms of use," 17 "legal notices," 18 "terms," 19 or other similar language
chosen by the website designer.
12

The term "browse-wrap" appears in Pollstar,170 F. Supp. 2d at 981; see also

Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95.
13 Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594. Hyperlinks may be found on many major
websites,
including
http://www.amazon.com,
("Conditions
of
Use"),
http://www.eBay.com, ("User Agreement"), http://www.msn.com, ("Terms of
Use"), and http://www.aol.com, ("Legal Notices").
14See supra note 4.
15 E.g.,

http://www.eBay.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
16 E.g., http://www.amazon.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
17E.g.,

http://www.msn.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
18 E.g., http://www.aol.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
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IH. Problem with Browse-wrap Agreements - Lack of
Mutual Assent
The greatest problem with enforcing browse-wrap agreements
is the distinct possibility of a lack of mutual assent between the
Internet user and the website as to the terms of the agreement.
Manifestation of mutual assent is necessary for the formation of any
binding contract:
Mutual assent which is essential to the formation of a
binding contract must be manifested by one party to the
other. Such mutual assent cannot be based on
subjective intent, but must be founded on an objective
manifestation of mutual assent to the essential terms of
the promise. In other words, the entry of the parties into
a contractual relationship must be manifested by some
intelligible conduct, act, or sign .

. .

. The meeting of

minds, which is essential to the formation of a contract,
is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties,
but by their expressed or manifested intentions ....
Mutual assent has been defined in several ways, and the
acceptable methods by which mutual assent may be manifested varies
depending on the definition. While mutual assent is vital to any
enforceable contract, evidence of mutual assent may be found without
formal oral or written agreement. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts defines manifestation of mutual assent as:
(1) The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or
partly by written or spoken words or by other acts
or by failure to act.
(2) The conduct of a party is not effective as a
manifestation of his assent unless he intends to
engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to
know that the other party may infer from his
conduct that he assents.
19 E.g., http://www.cnn.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).

20 17 AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 28 (1991).
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(3) The conduct of the party may manifest assent even
though he does not in fact assent. In such cases a
resulting contract may be voidable because of
fraud, 1 duress, mistake, or other invalidating
cause.

2

There is a clear difficulty in fitting browse-wrap agreements
into the traditional context of contract law. It would be difficult to
show mutual assent on the part of the user when there is no evidence
that the user actually read the terms or knew they existed. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the user ever intended to be bound by the
terms of the browse-wrap agreement because the user is not required
to affirmatively agree to, or even read, the terms of the agreement.
Nevertheless, very little litigation has developed around the
enforceability of these agreements, and until very recently no court
definitively held these agreements to be valid or invalid. However, by
tracing the recent case law in this area, one can see the emergence of a
trend in the law that may lead to blanket unenforceability of browsewrap agreements, and the standardization of the methods employed to
give users notice of the existence of on-line contracts.

IV. Development of Case Law Regarding Browse-wrap
Agreements
In order to understand the growing body of case law
surrounding browse wrap agreements, and the reasoning behind the
judicial determinations in this area, one must first look to the cases
that developed from shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements. The
cases dealing with these types of agreements essentially form one line,
and the courts have used the reasoning of prior shrink and click-wrap
cases in order to develop case law regarding browse-wrap agreements.
A. Shrink-Wrap Agreements
The leading case that upheld the enforceability of shrink-wrap
license agreements is ProCD v. Zeidenberg,22 decided in the Seventh
Circuit. In ProCD,the court considered a software license agreement
21 RESTATEMENT
22

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).

86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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enclosed within the product packaging. 23 Additionally, the license was
"encoded on the CD-ROM disk," and "appear[ed] on the user's screen
every time the software" ran. 24 ProCD's software contained a database
of more than 3,000 telephone directories, which it compiled at
considerable expense. 25 Zeidenberg ignored the license term that
stated that the information contained in the program must only be used
for non-commercial purposes, and proceeded to resell the information
contained on the software. 26 As a result, ProCD filed suit seeking an
injunction on the basis that Zeidenberg's dissemination
of ProCD's
27
agreement.
the
in
specified
rights
the
exceeded
database
In holding that this license agreement was valid as an
enforceable contract, 28 the court determined that it was impractical to
print all the terms on the outside of the package. 29 Furthermore,
because the agreement was printed inside the packaging, Zeidenberg
could have simply returned the product if he chose not to agree with
the terms.3 ° Most important to the court, however, was the fact that the
software could not be used without awareness of the terms, because
"the software splashed the license on the screen and would not let him
proceed without indicating acceptance." 3 1 The court stated that the
"vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct,"
and that "a buyer may accept by performing acts the vendor proposes
to treat as acceptance. 32 Based on this determination, the court held
that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable unless the terms 33are
objectionable for being unconscionable or violative of positive law.

23

Id. at 1449.

24Id. at 1450.
25

Id. at 1449.

26

Id. at 1450.

27 id.

28

Id. at 1449.

21

id. at 1451.

30

Id.

31 Id. at

1452.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 1449.
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The reasoning in ProCdwas expanded upon in Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc. 3 4 In Hill, a Gateway customer ordered a computer by

telephone, and the computer subsequently arrived in a box. 35 Within
the box, there was a license agreement that contained an arbitration
clause, as well as a provision that stated that the terms of the
agreement were to govern all disputes unless the computer was
returned within 30 days. 36 The customer, more than 30 days after
receiving the computer, chose to bring suit based on Gateway's
warranty. 37 Gateway moved
to compel arbitration based on the terms
38
of the license agreement.
The court held that by keeping and using the computer for
more than 30 days, the customer effectively assented to the terms of
the license agreement, and therefore was bound by the arbitration
clause. 39 The court stated that "a contract need not be read to be
effective .... ,,40 This reasoning is essentially an extension of a
statement made in ProCD, that "ProCD proposes a contract that the
buyer would accept by using the software after having an opportunity
to read the license at leisure. ' 4 1 Regardless of whether Hill actually
read the terms of the agreement, the Hill court concluded that he
effectively assented to the agreement through use of the product
alone.42
B. Click-wrap Agreements
The above cases have been extensively cited as grounds for
enforcing click-wrap agreements. 43 However, not all jurisdictions
follow the ProCD reasoning. 44 A leading click-wrap agreement case,
34 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
35

Id. at 1148.

36 Id.

37 id.

38

Id.at 1149.

9 Id.

at

4°Id.at

1149-50.
1148.

41 ProCD,86

F.3d at 1452.

42

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.

43

See, e.g., Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.

44 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).
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Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., enforced a click-wrap agreement
not based on shrink-wrap cases, but rather by comparing click-wrap
agreements to other types of contracts that have been held enforceable
without evidence that the purchaser had actual notice of particular
terms.45 While every court that has dealt with click-wrap agreements
has held them to be enforceable, 46 a nagging uncertainty with regard to
the notice issue is evident in the Caspi opinion. This uncertainty has
led to a change in the way courts view browse-wrap agreements.
Caspi was a class action law suit by some 1.5 million
Microsoft Network ("MSN") members based on MSN's practice of
"rolling over" members into more expensive plans without permission
or notice to the members.47 MSN subsequently sought to dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the forum selection clause
found in the MSN membership agreement, which provided that every
member consents that all disputes arising from use of MSN was within
the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the courts in King County,
Washington. 4 8 The clause was found within a click-wrap agreement
that must be agreed to before the member may use the service, and
before the member can be billed for the use of the service. 49 The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial
court's decision to dismiss the complaint, holding that the forum
selection clause was valid.5 °
The above court followed the logic of Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, which stated that a forum selection clause was reasonably
communicated to the consumer when it was presented in fine print,
within three pages of such fine print, and connected to the cruise
ticket. 51 The Caspi court discerned no great difference between the
41 Caspi, 732 A.2d at 530.
46

Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594.

47 Caspi, 732 A.2d at 529.
48 Id. at 529.
49

id. at 530.

'0 Id. at 529, 533.
51 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
It must be noted
that this case does not deal with click-wrap agreements, nor even the Internet, but is
rather the leading case dealing with the validity of forum selection clauses. Carnival
held valid a forum selection clause contained within three pages of fine print and
connected to the cruise ticket cruise ticket, and therefore dealt with the issue of
whether such a clause would be valid even if the consumer was unaware of its
existence.
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print and electronic mediums, and therefore held that the forum
selection clause was valid.52
The significance of Caspi is that the court found that a clause
within an online contract can be valid. However, the Caspi court stated
that Carnivaldid not control with regard to notice of the term, because
the plaintiffs in that case conceded that they had notice of the forum
selection clause. 53 The Caspi court determined that an MSN user
would be able to browse through the terms before accepting, thus
receiving notice of any terms of the contract. 54 Because Caspi was
determined to have had notice of the agreement, the court left open the
issue as to the enforceability of an agreement of which the user did not
have actual notice.55 The court stated that the issue of reasonableness
of notice is one of law rather than fact, and in this case, the plaintiff's
simply failed to show that they were not given adequate notice of the
term. 6 Therefore, the court noted that either party might be able to
show that click-wrap agreements in the form at issue are not
enforceable contracts, apart from the question of the validity and
enforceability of a forum selection clause in an otherwise enforceable
57
contract.
C. Browse-wrap Agreements
The click-wrap agreement seen in Caspi is fundamentally
different than a browse-wrap agreement because users are actually
forced to click "I Agree," thus giving the user an opportunity to read
the terms of the agreement. The court noted that because users must
click "I Agree," the users must have known that they were entering
into some kind of contract, and therefore invalidating all such
contracts would hamper commerce. 58 This is in contrast to the browsewrap agreement that must be actively sought out and read in order for
the user to be aware of the terms that regulate any movement within
52 Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532.
53 Id.; see also Carnival,499 U.S. at 590.

54 Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532.
55

Id. at 533.

56 Id. at 532-33.

57 Id. at 533.
58 Id. at 532.
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the website beyond the home page. The Caspi court was clearly aware
of the problem inherent in assuming that a user will actually scroll
through a complicated contract while actively engaged in Internet
activities. This is evident both in the court's aforementioned statements
concerning the problems of notice, as well as other statements
regarding the form in which an Internet contract takes. 59
The Caspi court discussed the possible problems of
enforceability that may develop if a website uses different typefaces,
colors, or font sizes, in order to confuse the user, or conceal or deemphasize certain terms. 60 While the court held that the MSN contract
did not present its contract in a misleading manner, the fact that the
court discussed such behavior is evidence that the court believed that
an agreement may be held to be unenforceable if presented in a
deceptive manner.
Despite the fact that Caspi seemed to confirm a judicial trend
towards blanket enforceability of all online contracts, two cases were
decided in California the following year that began a trend in the
opposite direction based on the concerns about notice and deception
enumerated by the Caspi court.
1. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc.
The first California case is Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets. Com,
6
Inc., decided in the U.S. District Court Central District of California. 1
Ticketmaster operated a website that allowed consumers to purchase
tickets to events that it often had an exclusive right to sell. 62 The
Ticketmaster home page contained a browse-wrap agreement entitled
"terms and conditions," which was only accessible if the user scrolled
down to the bottom of the page and located the small print hyperlink.6 3
The terms and conditions presented on this link were effectuated upon
the user as soon as the user ventured any further within the site beyond

59 id.
60
61

Id.
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
62 Id. at *2.
63

Id. at *2, *3.
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the home page. 64 The user, however, was able to go "deeper" into the
65
site without reading the terms.
Tickets.Com operated a similar website that allowed users to
purchase tickets to various events. 66 Additionally, Tickets.Com's site
also gave information about events to which it did not sell tickets, and
gave hyperlinks to other websites where such tickets were available to
buy. 6 7 Thus, when a Tickets.Com customer clicked on "Buy this ticket
from another on-line ticketing company," the customer was linked to
an interior page of Ticketmaster where the user could buy the ticket
from Ticketmaster. 68 This bypassed the home page where the terms
and conditions link was available and is a practice alternately known
as hyperlinking or deep-linking. This practice was forbidden by the
69
terms and conditions page presented on the Ticketmaster home page.
In this case, Ticketmaster alleged several causes of action
against Tickets.Com, however, the salient portion of the complaint
with regard to this discussion was the third claim - a breach of
contract action based on a violation of the terms and conditions set
forth on the Ticketmaster home page. 70 The terms of the agreement
provide that anyone going beyond the home page must comply with
the terms, which include that the information on the site must be used
for non-commercial purposes, and that deep-linking to the site was not
permitted. 7 1 Tickets.Com sought72 to dismiss this claim, along with the
others brought by Ticketmaster.
In order to defend its claim, Ticketmaster cited the shrink-wrap
license cases. However, the court distinguished the browse-wrap
agreement seen in this case from the shrink-wrap license because
shrink-wrap agreements are "open and obvious and in fact hard to
miss. 7 3 The court further distinguished browse-wrap agreements from
64 Id. at *3-*4.
65 Id.
66

Id. at *3.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at *3, *7.

70

Id. at *1, *7.

"' Id. at *7.
72

Id. at * 1.

73

Id. at *8
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click-wrap agreements because the Ticketmaster site does not require
the affirmative step of agreeing to the terms and conditions before
venturing further into the site.74 Therefore, the court held that because
many customers would likely proceed past the home page without
scrolling to the bottom of the page in order to click on the terms and
conditions link, it could not be said that "merely putting the terms and
conditions in this fashion necessarily creates a contract with one using
the website. 75 Tickets.Com's motion to dismiss was then granted with
regard to the breach of contract claim, with leave to amend for
Ticketmaster to present facts showing Tickets.Com's knowledge of,
and implied agreement to, the terms.76

While the Ticketmaster court did not make a definitive
statement about the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements in
general, the opinion gives weight to the Caspi court's concerns about
notice and deceptive practices. Ticketmaster stands for the notion that
browse-wrap agreements are far from per se enforceable. Seemingly,
Ticketmaster's agreement could not be valid unless it could prove that
Tickets.Com had actual notice of the agreement. Therefore, the clear
message of the Ticketmaster court is that websites with terms and
conditions should be presented in the click-wrap format in order to
force actual notice upon users of the website, and consequently avoid
the risk of litigation resulting from lack of notice.
2. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd.
The second California case is Pollstarv. GigmaniaLtd., which
77
contains an almost identical fact pattern as that seen in Ticketmaster.
Pollstar developed a website that contained concert information, and
alleged that Gigmania downloaded information off the Pollstar site
and used this information on its own site.78 Pollstar alleged a breach of
contract claim based on a breach of its browse-wrap license

74 Id.

75 id.
76 Id.

77Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
78

Id. at 976.
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agreement. 79 Gigmania filed a motion to dismiss this claim8 based on a
lack of mutual assent with regard to the license agreement. 0
The browse-wrap agreement in Pollstar was not set forth on
the home page, but could only be accessed by linking to another
page. 8' Moreover, the court was concerned about the confusing and
deceptive manner in which was agreement was presented to users. 82 In
Pollstar's website, notice of the agreement was given in small gray
print against a gray background. 83 Also, the notice was not underlined
according to common Internet practice to show an active link, and
therefore, the court noted that many users would not be aware of the
link. The home page also contained many words in small blue print
that did not link to another8page when clicked on, which is also
contrary to standard practice. The result of this behavior by Pollstar
would be to confuse users by causing them to believe that all colored
small text does not link to another page, which is contrary to the fact
that the terms and conditions page is in fact linked by small colored
print.86
Pollstar, like Ticketmaster, attempted to compare its browsewrap agreement to the shrink-wrap agreements that had previously
been held to be enforceable in ProCD.87 The court distinguished
browse-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements, but noted that no court had
ruled on the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements. 88 However,
the court did agree with Gigmania that many visitors to the Pollstar
website may not be aware of the of the agreement because notice of
the agreement is provided by "small gray text on a gray
background.",89 Therefore, the court determined that a lack of mutual
79 Id.
80 id.

81Id. at

981.

82 Id.

83
84

Id. at 982.
Id.

85 Id.

86 Id.
87

Id. at 981.

88 id.
89

Id.
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9
assent was a valid issue in light of the problems with notice. 0
However, the Pollstar court simply chose not to decide the mutual
assent issue and was not willing to declare on the validity and
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements in general. 91
Rather, the court stated that browse-wrap agreements may
arguably be valid and enforceable based on examples of other
contracts that are enforceable despite the fact that the consumer enters
into the contract without first seeing the terms. 92 These contracts
include those attached to airline and concert tickets, which are
enforced when the consumer either boards the plane or enters the
concert. 9 3 While the court failed to decide the issue of the
enforceability of browse-wrap agreement, the court did discuss some
of the same concerns about notice expressed in Caspi and
Ticketmaster. 94

3. A Possible End to the Controversy: Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.
Specht, decided on July 3, 2001 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, dealt with a browse-wrap
agreement in the context of free software offered on the Internet. 95 The
litigation in this case developed out of a class action alleging that
software offered by the defendant transmitted private information
about user's file transfer activity to the defendant in violation of two

90

Id. at 982.

91Id.
92

Id. at 981.

93 Id.

94 These issues include problems of notice, such as the fact that the user may not
have read the terms of the agreement. However, more important to this discussion
are the statements about the confusion of users about the nature of such agreements,
and the difficulty in even finding the browse-wrap licenses. These concerns become
more problematic because of the lack of uniformity in the notice of browse-wrap
agreements, and through deceptive practices such as those seen in the Polistarcase
(such as giving notice of the agreement in small gray print against a gray
background).
95 Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
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federal statutes. 96 The software, known as SmartDownload, was
available from the Netscape website free of charge. 97 While use of
Netscape Navigator requires assent to a click-wrap agreement, the
SmartDownload software was governed by a browse-wrap
agreement. 98 Netscape moved to compel arbitration of the claims,
arguing that the dispute was subject to a binding arbitration clause
found in SmartDownload's browse-wrap license agreement. 99 The
court was therefore asked "to decide if an offer of a license agreement,
made independently of freely offered software and not expressly
accepted by the user of that software, nevertheless binds the user to an
arbitration clause contained in that license."100 The court held that
arbitration should not be compelled because
the browse-wrap
01
agreement was not an enforceable contract.
Following a discussion of the case law surrounding shrinkwrap and click-wrap agreements, the court concluded that the
SmartDownload agreement was a browse-wrap agreement such as that
seen in Pollstar10 2 The court rejected the notion that simply
downloading the software indicated assent, because downloading is
done for the purpose of obtaining a product, not to assent to an
agreement. ° 3 The user downloading the software did not need to view
any agreement, and was not given any notice that such agreement
existed. 04 The only notice of the agreement "is one small box of text
referring to the license agreement, text that appears below the screen
used for downloading."' 15 The Specht court concluded that mutual
assent "is the bedrock of any agreement to which the law will give
force. Defendant's position, if accepted, would so expand the
Id. The statutes at issue were the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18

96

U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2001), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (2001).
97 Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
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Id. at 595.

99

Id. at 587.
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definition of assent as to render it meaningless."' 0 6 Arbitration was not
compelled, simply because the 07court held that the plaintiffs did not
assent to the license agreement.'

V. Conclusion: The Future of Browse-wrap Agreements
The Specht opinion can be seen as both the logical and
chronological result of all the preceding cases dealing with on-line
contracts. Of the three types of agreements discussed, browse-wrap
agreements demand the least consumer interaction because they need
not even be viewed. Both click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements
purport to demand notice of the terms, whether or not the consumer in
fact reads them, and thus they are more apt to be held enforceable. The
problem of mutual assent is greatest when dealing with the
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements, and thus it is logical that
these agreements have become the most difficult for courts to hold
valid. While the courts, up until the Specht court, hesitated to make a
definitive statement about the enforceability of browse-wrap
agreements, it seems difficult to argue with the Specht reasoning.
Therefore, the next logical progression in the jurisprudence concerning
browse-wrap agreements is that they will increasingly be held to be
invalid.
The clear message given by these cases to website operators is
that click-wrap agreements are vastly preferred to browse-wrap
agreements. The problems concerning notice and mutual assent with
browse-wrap licenses are so pervasive that it renders them ineffectual.
Therefore, it seems likely that in the future, Internet users may find
themselves faced with a click-wrap agreement every time they enter a
new home page. While this may result in breaking up the continuity of
the Web experience, the trade-off of knowing that contracts do effect
use of Web based information is worth the minor hassle.
Beyond the legal questions surrounding the enforceability of
browse-wrap user agreements, consumers are clearly affected by the
lack of uniformity seen throughout the Internet. Without a uniform
standard governing how websites present notice of terms and
conditions to users, a significant number of Internet users will
continue to gather, use, and even distribute web based information
'6

Id. at 596.

107

id.
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oblivious to the possible legal ramifications of their actions.
Furthermore, as e-commerce expands, and more and more people
utilize the Internet to purchase goods and services, the risk of users
agreeing to terms of contracts of which they are not aware increases
concurrently. Therefore, the days of the hidden browse-wrap
agreement may be coming to an end, and an age of universal clickwrap licensing may be on the horizon.

